

## Message Text

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ACTION EA-13

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-10 NSC-10 NSCE-00 CIAE-00

INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 PM-03 DODE-00 L-02 PRS-01 OMB-01

EB-03 COME-00 TRSE-00 COA-01 DRC-01 IO-03 /074 W

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R 010655Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7877

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USLO PEKING

USMISSION USUN NY

CINCPAC HONOLULU HA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 14218

LIMDIS

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA, UR

SUBJECT: PRIMIN TANAKA'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

REF: A. TOKYO 13014; B. TOKYO 13289 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: FONOFF BELIEVES PRIMIN TANAKA ACHIEVED AS MUCH AS COULD BE EXPECTED IN MOSCOW UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. SOVS ORAL AGREEMENT THAT NORTHERN TERRITORIES ARE AMONG PROBLEMS INHIBITING CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATY, AND THAT FORMULATION IN JOINT COMMUNIQUE, ARE CONSIDERED MODEST STEP FORWARD. VISIT HAD NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT NEGOTIATIONS. FONOFF IS NOW CONTEMPLATING NEW TACTICS TO ACHIEVE GOALS OF ITS SOVIET POLICY. END SUMMARY.

1. IN LONG, RELAXED CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF, FONOFF

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FIRST EE DIV HEAD ARAI PROVIDED PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF

PRIMIN TANAKA'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. AWARE THAT VI HOGEN HAD ALREADY PROVIDED AMBASSADOR INGERSOLL WITH ANALYSIS OF KEY POINTS (REF B), ARAI ENDEAVORED TO FILL IN BACK-GROUND ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND CONVEY ATMOSPHERICS OF HOW SCENARIO PLAYED OUT.

2. ARAI WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED THAT HIS PREDICTIONS (REF A) HAD BEEN LARGELY BORNE OUT BY EVENTS. THERE WERE, HE CONTENDED, NO SURPRISES. FINAL TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE WAS VERY CLOSE TO ORIGINAL JAPANESE DRAFT. GOJ WAS OF COURSE NOT "PLEASED" WITH RESULTS OF MOSCOW MEETINGS BUT FONOFF BELIEVES JAPANESE SIDE DID BEST IT COULD UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN "TOUGH" ALL THE WAY.

3. AS FOR HOW WELL USSR HAS FARED IN ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVES, ARAI SAID SOVS TRIED UNTIL "FINAL MOMENT" TO GET SOMETHING INTO COMMUNIQUE ON ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY, BUT HAD FAILED. BHEY DID BETTER ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION, THOUGH NO SEPARATE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED. IN THIS CONNECTION, ARAI COMMENTED THAT SOVS HAD PLACED MUCH GREATER EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION THAN ON PEACE TREATY IN THEIR INITIAL DRAFT COMMUNIQUE: ONLY TWO LINES ON LATTER POINT BUT TWENTY-TWO ON FORMER.

4. ARAI'S ACCOUNT OF DISCUSSIONS ON NORTHERN TERRITORIES COVERED SAME POINTS MADE BY VICE MIN HOGEN (REF B) THOUGH WITH MORE ATMOSPHERICS. JAPANESE SIDE, AT CONCLUSION OF FIRST DAY'S MEETINGS, MADE TACTICAL JUDGEMENT THAT ONLY HOPE FOR PROGRESS ON NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE WOULD BE IF MEETINGS WERE REDUCED IN SIZE (TO ELIMINATE CLAQUE TO WHOM MOST OF BREZHNEV'S RHETORIC APPEARED TO BE ADDRESSED) AND IF JAPANESE TOOK VERY TOUGH LINE. ARAI SPENT MOST OF THAT NIGHT REWRITING PRIMIN TANAKA'S LUNCHEON SPEECH FOR SECOND DAY, ELIMINATING ALL GENEROUS AND FLATTERING TOUCHES AND TURNING SPEECH INTO SHORT, RESOLUTE PIECE CONCERNING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON TERRITORIAL ISSUE. ARAI BELIEVES THAT THIS POSTURE, HOWEVER ANNOYING TO SOVS, PAID DIVIDENDS. ARAI SAID IT WAS COINCIDENTAL THAT HE HAD THOUGHT OF USING PHRASE FROM BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AS COMPROMISE LANGUAGE ON NORTHERN TERRITORY ISSUE, WHEN SOVS CAME UP WITH SAME

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IDEA. DURING WHAT PROVED TO BE FINAL DISCUSSION ON NORTHERN TERRITORIES, SOVS HAD INSISTED THAT COMMUNIQUE REFERENCE TO "PROBLEM" RELATING TO CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATY MUST BE PLURAL (I.E. PROBLEMS). PRIMIN TANAKA HAD THEN ASKED BREZHNEV IF THAT WORD INCLUDED FOUR ISLANDS AND BREZHNEV SAID YES. ARAI CONTENDS THAT WITH THAT DECISION ON OCT 10, USSR WILL NO LONGER SAY NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE WAS SETTLED BY WWII, AS HAD BEEN LINE IN PAST. ARAI LOOKS

UPON THIS AS SMALL BUT POSITIVE STEP, THOUGH HE READILY ADMITS ACTUAL RETURN OF NORTHERN TERRITORIES APPEARS TO BE LONG WAY OFF. (SOMEWHAT JOKINGLY, HE SAID HIS SECRET AMBITION IS TO GET THEM BACK WITHIN THREE YEARS.)

5. CONCERNING PEACE TREATY, ARAI SAID MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN REACHED THAT NEGOTIATIONS MUST CONTINUE IN 1974 AND AT LEAST AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. INASMUCH AS BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN AND PODGORNYY HAVE ALL ACCEPTED INDIVIDUAL INVITATIONS TO VISIT JAPAN, ANY ONE OF THEM COULD HEAD NEGOTIATING TEAM.

6. ARAI SAID BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION OVER NATURE OF THEIR WORKING CONTACTS. KOSYGIN COMPLAINED THAT TOO MANY PEOPLE IN JAPAN ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF RELATIONS WITH USSR. TANAKA THREW POINT BACK BY NOTING THAT JAPANESE ARE OBLIGED TO DEAL WITH TWELVE DIFFERENT MINISTERS. KOSYGIN THEN SAID SOVS WILL NAME ONE PERSON AS OVERALL HEAD FOR DEALING WITH JAPAN, BUT SOVS HAVE YET TO INDICATE WHO THIS WILL BE. ARAI'S GUESS IS THAT IT WILL BE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NOBIKOV.

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R 060655Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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LIMDIS

7. TWO SIDES ALSO REVIEWED PROBLEMS CREATED BY THEIR DIFFERING ECONOMIES. JAPANESE MADE CLEAR THAT PRIVATE ECONOMIC INTERESTS HAD TO BE SATISFIED WITH ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE GOJ COULD OFFER SUPPORT. ARAI SAID SOVIETS FINALLY AGREED ORALLY TO THIS POINT.

8. WITH RESPECTS TO SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT, ARAI COMMENTED THAT BREZHNEV (AND KOSYGIN FOR THAT MATTER) DESPITE TWO AND HALF HOUR HARANGUE ON NATURAL WEALTH OF SIBERIA, WAS QUITE IGNORANT ON SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. ON THIS SUBJECT, KOSYGIN PUT THREE BOLD QUESTIONS TO TANAKA: (A) HOW MUCH WOULD GOJ GIVE; (B) IN WHICH PROJECTS SHOULD US PARTICIPATE; (C) WHOM SHOULD SOVS APPROACH WITHIN GOJ TO GET DEFINITIVE COMMITMENT? ARAI COMMENTED THAT, NEEDLESS TO SAY, TANAKA DID NOT RESPOND SINCE THERE ARE NO SHORT ANSWERS TO ANY OF THESE. ARAI CONCLUDED THAT TANAKA'S VISIT TO MOSCOW HAS HAD NO GREAT EFFECT ON CONFIDENTIAL

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SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSIONS NOW IN PROGRESS.

9. WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS ON "SAFETY OF FISHING", ARAI EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE ANNOYANCE WITH WAY IN WHICH JAPANESE AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES MINISTER SAKURAUCHI HAS MUDDIED WATERS. BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, ARAI MENTIONED THAT SAKURAUCHI (LARGELY FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS) HAD WISHED TO VISIT MOSCOW IN SEPTEMBER. FONOFF WAVED HIM OFF ON GROUNDS THAT SUCH VISIT WOULD COMPLICATE PREPARATIONS FOR PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT IN OCTOBER. SAKURAUCHI WAS FURIOUS WITH DELAY AND IN FACT INSISTED AT TIME OF POSTPONEMENT THAT NEW DATE BE SET IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TANAKA'S VISIT. ARAI WENT ON TO SAY THAT DURING TANAKA'S VISIT, FISHING ISSUES HAD NOT BEEN PURSUED BECAUSE OF INTRANSIGENT REACTIONS OF SOVS. THEREFORE, NOT SURPRISINGLY, WHEN SAKURAUCHI ARRIVED IN MOSCOW FEW DAYS LATER TO NEGOTIATE ON FISHERIES, HE GOT ABSOLUTELY NOWHERE. ISSUE HAS NOW BEEN FURTHER COMPLICATED BY REVELATION THAT JAPANESE AND SOVIET TEXTS OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE, AS SIGNED BY PRINCIPALS, DIFFER ON TWO POINTS OF PHRASEOLOGY. SPECIFICALLY, SOVIET TEXT FAILED TO INCLUDE CLAUSE STATING THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON FISHERIES WOULD CONTINUE. THIS OMISSION, WHEN IT CAME TO LIGHT, CAUSED CONSIDERABLE ADVERSE CRITICISM FROM JAPANESE PRESS AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION, AND EVEN LED FONMIN OHIRA TO STATE THAT HE WOULD DISCIPLINE FONOFF OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE. (COMMENT: EMBASSY IS SKEPTICAL THAT OVERSIGHT, WHICH OCCURRED BECAUSE COMMUNIQUE WAS RUSHED TO COMPLETION -- SEE ACCOUNT IN REF B --

WILL ACTUALLY BE CAUSE FOR ANY SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTION.)

9. AS OVERALL ASSESSMENT, ARAI FELT TANAKA HAD DONE SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN SIMPLY HOLDING HIS OWN AGAINST VERY TOUGH COMPETITION. HE AGREED WITH HOGEN (REF B) THAT WAY NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE WAS HANDLED IN COMMUNIQUE REPRESENTED SIGNIFICANT THOUGH MODEST STEP FORWARD. OBVIOUSLY WRUNG OUT FROM EFFORTS PUT INTO PREPARATION AND EXECUTION OF TANAKA VISIT, ARAI HAD NO IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO EMBOFF'S INQUIRY AS TO STEPS FONOFF PLANS TO TAKE NEXT. HE DID OBSERVE THAT ENTIRELY NEW TACTICS WILL BE REQUIRED SINCE TANAKA'S VIGOROUS, TENACIOUS LINE PROBABLY ACHIEVED ITS MAXIMUM EFFECT FOR TIME BEING.  
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## Message Attributes

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